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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES FOR BANKS. 
A FINANCIAL STABILITY PERSPECTIVE 
Prof. Dirk Heremans 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance is being challenged by increasingly f luid and global mark et places. 
Recently,  accounting scandals and the corporate crisis involved have moved the corporate 
governance debate to the f oref ront of  public policy. 
I n the af termath of  these crises,  f inancial institutions and bank s in particular,  are ex pected 
to play an active gatek eeper role monitoring the behaviour of  their corporate clients
1. This 
evolution necessarily brings into f ocus the corporate governance of  the monitoring bank s 
themselves,  as its also evolves within the rapidly changing f inancial landscape. 
The  maj or  issue  to  be  addressed  in  this  contribution  is  whether  corporate  governance 
principles  specif ying  the  organisation  of   the  relationships  within  the  corporation  are 
homogenous  to  all  f irms.  S pecif ically  the  q uestion  is  whether  the  ( optimal)   corporate 
governance design f or non- f inancial f irms is to be ex tended to the bank ing f irms as bank s 
are subj ect to f inancial regulation ref lecting the overall concern f or stability of  the f inancial 
system. 
This q uestion is approached f irst by investigating the specif ic characteristics of  bank s,  how 
these  specif icities  af f ect  agency  problems  f or  bank s  as  well  as  the  f unctioning  of   the 
governance mechanisms put in place in order to cope with agency distortions. I t appears 
that corporate governance tends to f ocus on eq uity governance,  whereas f or bank s debt 
agency problems are also a serious concern if  only as the result of  a very high debt to 
eq uity ratio in f inancial intermediaries ( see Dewatripont and Tirole,  19 9 4 ) . 
                                                
1 S ee Blommestein,  20 0 6 ,  or Degryse and Van Cayseele,  19 9 9 . 3
Next, taking a banking stability perspective the relationship between risk taking by banks 
and governance structures are further explored. Trade-offs between equity governance and 
debt governance for banks affect the choices for specific governance mechanisms, but also 
the broader debate on the appropriateness of different corporate governance systems. 
Third,  after  evaluating  ownership  structures,  functioning  of  the  board  of  directors  and 
remuneration systems with respect to their impact on banks risk taking, an attempt is 
made to outline an adapted corporate governance model for banks 
F inally, the framework for the conceptualisation of these issues awaiting further empirical 
evidence, is extended briefly to non-bank financial institutions. It is also used for a brief 
(critical) assessment of some recent EU legislative initiatives w.r.t. corporate governance. 
1.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT IS SPECIFIC FOR BANKS?
Corporate governance arrangements specify the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
among different participants in the corporation and spell out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions in corporate affairs. Through this structure the company objectives are 
set and the means provided for attaining those objectives and for monitoring performance 
(see OECD 1999). 
According to an extensive and ever growing economic literature the modern corporation is 
to be approached as a  complex web or nexus of contractual relationships  facing  agency 
problems  in its organisation. 
Traditionally the focus is on  equity governance   i.e. the  conflicts  of interest between 
owners  and  management,  and/ or  between  controlling  and  minority  shareholders.  The 
challenge is to constitute and efficient monitoring structure for these conflicting interests. 
This, however, may be too limited a view with respect to the general corporate finance 
problem, i.e. raising finance efficiently. Corporate finance includes both equity and debt. 4
Corporate  governance  mechanisms  may  have  to  be  set  up  in  a  way  that  limit  agency 
distortions also in raising debt, i.e. for debt governance
2.
Banking firms constitute a web or nexus of contractual relationships and hence face also 
agency distortions in raising finance efficiently. The issue to be further investigated is 
whether  these  agency  problems  w.r.t.  the  conflicts  of  interests  and  the  scope  of 
stakeholders involved present special characteristics for banks compared to non-financial 
firms. To what extent does this affect existing corporate governance arrangements?  Should 
they be designed differently for banks?  
Bank Characteristics and Agency Distortions 
Banks present several specific characteristics that may affect agency problems. Banks are 
highly leveraged firms, i.e. with a very high debt to equity ratio on their balance sheet. An 
important part of their debt consists of highly liquid demand deposits. Their assets to the 
contrary  being  illiquid,  the  maturity  mismatch  involves  substantial  risks  for  their  debt 
holders.
The nature of their products and services, as well as of their claimholders differs from non-
financial  firms.  Bank  products  are  of  a  fiduciary  nature  and  bank  balance  sheets  are 
notoriously opaque for investors. The quality of the loan portfolio is difficult to evaluate 
and financial products become increasingly complex. Information asymmetry problems are 
very  serious,  making  it  difficult  to  monitor  the  behaviour  of  banks.  Moreover,  the 
multitude of debtors, i.e. small depositors, are non experts in monitoring. Hence, banks 
rely  critically  on  depositor  confidence
3.  The  situation  is  different  in  non-financial 
companies, where debtholders have generally more incentives and expertise in monitoring. 
Moreover, in non-financial companies debt is mainly in the hands of a few specialised 
debtholders.  The  main  creditors  are  often  banks  themselves  which  have  the  necessary 
expertise and power to play a disciplining role in case of financial distress. 
Banking,  moreover  presents  systemic  externalities  raising  special  concerns  for  bank 
solvency and financial stability. The threat to the stability of the financial system depends 
                                                
2 With  the  focus  no  longer  on  equity  governance,  i.e.  only  on  shareholders  value,  corporate  governance  may  be 
approached within an even broader view of the stakeholder society. Corporate governance is then defined as the design 
of institutions that induce or force management to internalise the welfare of all stakeholders (Tirole, 2001). This 
broader scope, however, will not be explicitly pursued in this contribution. 
3 For a survey see e.g. Llewellyn, 2004. 5
on the occurrence of negative disturbances and the presence of negative externalities such 
that economic shocks have a system-wide character. Traditionally systemic risks find their 
origin predominantly in banking problems. Banks are subject to many shocks as they face 
different types of risk such as liquidity, credit, market and operating risks. Moreover, the 
banking system contains powerful propagation mechanisms that can amplify small initial 
shocks  as  they  are  much  more  interconnected  than  is  the  case  in  other  sectors  of  the 
economy. Bankruptcy of one institution may easily spill-over to others and endanger the 
whole financial system. Whereas traditional contagion mechanisms of runs by depositions 
on banks in trouble may no longer apply in a world where depositors benefit from deposit 
insurance,  these  domino  effects  are  more  likely  to  occur  at  the  wholesale  level,  in 
particular through the interbank market. The greater reliance on interbank financing may 
decrease the probability of individual bank failure, but increases the probability of total 
collapse. Real economic activity may severely be disrupted as money production is at the 
core of the banking system. It is a special commodity with a vital payments function in the 
economy.  The  wider  macroeconomic  distortions  in  case  of  banks  distress  explain  the 
special concern for banking and financial stability
4.
The  question  then  arises  whether  these  specific  bank  characteristics  create  specific 
corporate governance concerns for banks compared to non-financial firms?  
Hence,  we  address  the  two  standard  types  of  agency  distortions  relating  to  equity 
governance, but introduce also a third one concerning debt governance, which may be of 
particular importance to banks. 
Type 1:  Management control bias: conflict between shareholders and management. 
Conflicts of interest arise in firms due to the separation of ownership and (management) 
control as stressed originally by Berle and Means (1932). With external finance by equity 
holders managers earn less than the full return on their effort. Hence, their incentives to 
exert effort may be too low and they have an interest in pursuing their private interests. 
Dispersed  shareholders  face  a  free  rider  problem  and  have  little  incentive  to  monitor 
managers. Excessive managerial power then amounts to the expropriation of (dispersed) 
shareholders by management. 
                                                
4 See Heremans, 2003 for a further analysis of systemic risks in Europe in the context of a single financial services 
market and a consolidating financial sector. 6
As financial products are very information intensive, i.e. opaque and of a fiduciary nature 
due  to  market  imperfections  and  information  asymmetries  characterising  the  financial 
sector, it becomes even more difficult to control management in the banking sector
5.
Type 2:  Expropriation  of  minority  shareholders:  conflicts  between  controlling  and 
minority shareholders. 
Controlling blockholders may have incentives and the power to pursue their own private 
interest  in  companies.  Through  transactions  which  are  not  conducted  at  arms  length, 
especially  within  group  structures,  they  may  shift  wealth  to  other  members,  thereby 
abusing small (more dispersed) shareholders. 
The incentives for controlling owners to expropriate corporate resources, however, very 
much depend on their cash flow rights as will be further argued below. 
As  financial  products  are  very  opaque  and  the  balance  sheets of  banks  very  complex, 
inside transactions are more difficult to control by small shareholders. Moreover, they lack 
the incentives and also the necessary expertise to do so. Hence, type 2 agency problems 
may become more serious. 
Type 3 :  Risk  shifting to debt holders: conflicts between shareholders and creditors 
Shareholders have convex claims on the income of the firm, while debtholders claim are 
concave (see J . Tirole, 2006). Equity holders earn the residual income i.e. all the upside 
potential and only a limited downside loss. Hence, they have an incentive to engage the 
firm in taking (excessive) risk. In fact these risks are shifted to debt holders who are only 
entitled to a fixed contractual payment. 
This moral haz ard problem certainly is more serious in the financial sector compared to 
other  sectors  in  the  economy.  The  high  proportion  of  debt  in  total  liabilities  and  the 
resulting high leverage of banks, facilitates risk shifting by shareholders. The opportunities 
for risk shifting are also larger given that the debt holders are dispersed and non-experts 
compared to the monitoring by creditors in non-financial firms
6.
                                                
5 See Devriese, Dewatripont, Heremans, Nguyen, 2004, p. 97 . Shareholders have the right to take decisions, i.e. formal 
control. They, however, may not have the ability to take decisions i.e. real control, as it typically requires prior 
information about the consequences of potential decisions. Shareholders dispersion, moreover, reduces shareholders 
incentives to acquire information and therefore to exercise real control. 
  On the other hand, it has been argued that high leverage confronts managers with the threat of illiquidity which may 
constrain and incentiviz e them. As this may apply to non-financial firms, it may be questioned whether the available 
safety nets providing liquidity for banks do not eliminate these market forces. See Tirole, 2006. 
6 Debt in a higher leveraged firms ressembles equity in a modestly leveraged one. Debt holders become basically also 
residual claimants at all income levels ,see Tirole, 2006.. 7
Moreover, favouring (excessive) risk taking by banks, i.e. the type 3 agency distortions, 
may  have  systemic  externalities  when  it  leads  to  banking  failures  which  eventually 
endanger  the  stability  of  the  whole  financial  sector.  Hence,  compared  to  non-financial 
firms, type 3 agency problems are a more serious concern for banking firms. 
Corporate governance mechanisms and banking regulation 
In  order  to  contain  the  different  types  of  agency  distortions  several  mechanisms  are 
operative affecting the power and the incentives of the different parties involved in modern 
corporations.  Specific  mechanisms  are  additionally  provided  for  banks  and  the  whole 
financial sector through extensive financial regulation and supervision. 
The  basic  governance  mechanisms  as  they  apply  to  all  firms  mainly  address  equity 
governance problems and may be distinguished as follows:  
(i)  legal intervention:  Formal control is guaranteed to the equity owners by corporate 
law. This may operate directly through shareholder democracy, or indirectly through 
the board of directors as a specialist monitor of management. 
(ii)  market discipline:  Monitoring by interested parties such as shareholders, creditors, 
clients, rating agencies and financial analysts depends on their incentives to monitor 
and their ability to do so. It requires information disclosure and transparency to be 
further based on the legal setting of accounting and audit standards. 
(iii)  also self regulation (soft law) in the form of codes of conduct being a more flexible 
instrument  may  provide  the  necessary  checks  and  balances  to  contain  agency 
distortions
7.
(iv)  the ultimate market discipline is the market for corporate control being subject to 
take-over legislation. 
The  banking  sector,  moreover,  is  subject  to  specific  regulatory  and  supervisory 
intervention by the financial authorities. Traditionally the goals of financial regulation and 
prudential  supervision  are  double.    The  emphasis  has  been  upon  the  stability  of  the 
financial system thereby protecting depositors and other creditors against the risk of loss as 
a  second  objective.  Concerns  for  competition,  transparency  of  financial  markets  and 
integrity in the conduct of business as a third objective are of a more recent date. 
The main objectives of regulation remain to monitor type 3 agency problems, i.e. to avoid 
excessive  riske  taking  by  banks  and  thereby  shifting  the  risk  to  depositors  and  other 
                                                
7 Tirole, 2006, argues that such codes educate the general public and may help the corresponding practices to enjoy 
network externalities inherent in familiar institutions. 8
creditors.  In  this  respect  the  regulatory  and  supervisory  authorities  are  to  be  seen  as 
corresponding to the need for a representative of the depositors. In view of the specific 
debt governance problems they mimic the role taken by debt holders in non-financial 
firms (see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). 
The need for such a strong depositor representative is especially great for banks as deposit 
insurance and lender of last resort facilities are being provided in order to avoid systemic 
risk  through  selffulfilling  panics.  Such  safety  nets  affect  the  risk  behaviour  of  banks: 
deposit insurance weakens the incentives for depositors to monitor bank risks, and bail-out 
practices may increase risk incentives for shareholders. Hence, in order to limit this moral 
hazard behaviour, extensive prudential regulation had to be introduced relying mainly upon 
capital adequacy requirements. Capital not only provides a buffer against losses, it also 
reduces risk incentives as more of the own funds of the banks are at stake (see Heremans 
2000). The effectiveness of these regulations is constantly being challenged. Recently it 
has led to the design of better risk-adjusted capital requirements, but also the enhancement 
of market discipline in the Basel II proposals
8.
The question arises, however, whether the higher level of regulation for banks compared to 
non-financial firms has not removed the need for other governance mechanisms to deal 
with the agency distortions within banks?  
It appears that regulatory oversight is not a substitute, but rather a complement to corporate 
governance (see Adams and Mehran 2003). 
Hence,  financial  regulators  increasingly  acknowledge  the  importance  of  corporate 
governance.  Structural  deregulation  in  the  financial  sector  has  gradually  eliminated  a 
activity  restrictions  that  limited  competition,  but  improved  stability  by  containing  the 
possibility of contagion in the banking sector. Hence the potential for spill-overs between 
business  lines  and  for  conflicts  of  interest  and  agency  distortions  have  increased. 
Additional sources of contagion are created within larger financial conglomerates, which 
by their sheer size present also systemic risk ramifications. 
There are also limitations to the effectiveness of prudential regulation as is recognised in 
the Basel II design of capital requirement. It allows the use of internal models of risk 
                                                
8 The high burden of regulation on banks is often being criticised. Recently also evidence has been presented that it may 
have negative affects on bank development and valuation, without evidence that it promotes bank stability. Policies 
that empower private monitoring, however, have a positive effect. See Caprio, Lavaert, Levine ,2003.. 9
management as banks through their credit monitoring have better information than the 
supervisors  on  the  true  risks  of  their  clients.    These  internal  bank  models  are  to  be 
reviewed and validated by supervisors putting heavy pressures on supervisory resources.  
Moreover, the supervisory review of the organisation of risk management is becoming 
very complex as banks are using increasingly sophisticated risk-management instruments 
to  better  fine-tune  their  own  risk  preferences.    Hence,  supervisors  have  to  rely  more 
heavily on the existence of sound governance principles and practices within banks. The 
organisation of these procedures is heavily dependent on the specifics of the corporate 
governance of banks (See Devriese e.a. 2004). 
More generally, the regulatory and supervisory function mainly aiming at debt governance 
is  facilitated  by  sound  corporate  governance  structures  with  respect  to  risk  taking  in 
banks
9.  Hence  the  question  to  be  explored  next:  How  do  corporate  governance 
arrangements w.r.t. relationships between shareholders, directors and managers affect debt 
governance problems? 
2. CORPORATE GOVERANCE SYSTEMS AND DEBT GOVERNANCE 
The corporate governance debate is usually underpinned by efficiency concerns for equity 
governance as will be documented first. A banking stability perspective, however, brings 
debt governance issues to the forefront and raises several questions that go beyond the 
usual efficiency debate. 
Are  corporate  governance  arrangements  w.r.t.  shareholders  structures,  management 
incentives and the composition of the board of directors that apply for non-financial firms 
also  appropriate  for  the  functioning  of  banks?  As  banks  are  particularly  vulnerable  to 
excessive risk taking, it has to be investigated how these different corporate governance 
arrangements affect the incentives and the power of the parties involved in banking to 
assume (excessive) risk. The analysis of these corporate governance elements may also 
cast some new light in the broader debate on the relative merits and disadvantages of the 
main corporate governance systems. 
                                                
9 Financial  regulators  increasingly  acknowledge  the  importance  of  corporate  governance.  In  Belgium  this  issue  is 
already for decades addressed by the Agreements on Bank Autonomy to be concluded between financial authorities 
and banks.10
Equity governance systems 
Type 1 equity governance problems, i.e. excessive managerial power, are addressed by 
several corporate governance mechanisms: 
(i)  an active market for corporate control disciplining management;  
(ii)  the board of directors acting as a monitoring specialist of management;  
(iii)  performance linked contracts to remunerate and incentivize management;  
(iv)  shareholding  activism  restoring  shareholders  democracy,  i.e.  real  power  for 
shareholders. 
These governance mechanisms are representative for the Anglo-American outsider system. 
As it is characterised by dispersed ownership, type 2 agency problems of expropriation of 
minority  shareholders  are  avoided.  Type  1  problems  of  excessive  managerial  power, 
however, become  more  serious and have to be curbed by the  above  mechanisms. The 
effectiveness in reality, however, of the market for corporate control is to be questioned. 
Moreover, for banks the take-over market tends to less active. Hence the role of the board 
of directors becomes all the more important. 
Agency problems and the mix of governance mechanisms to remedy them, are different in 
the Continental European insider system. Due to concentrated ownership stock exchanges 
are less active, limiting seriously the operation of the market for corporate control. Type 1 
agency problems, however, are less serious as big blockholders have the power and the 
incentives  to  better  monitor  management  within  the  board  of  directors.  Blockholders 
monitoring substitutes for performance linked pay ,which as a result tends to be more 
restricted on the European continent. 
A  new  concern,  however,  is  the  high  potential  for  type  2  agency  problems.  Majority 
shareholders have the power to extract wealth from the firm thereby harming the minority 
shareholders.  In  order  to  curb  type  2  agency  problems  regulatory  procedures  may  be 
introduced e.g. intragroup transactions are to be supervised by independent directors in the 
board. Hence, governance mechanism such as the composition of the board of directors 
and shareholding activism to control this become important in this insider system. 11
Governance Systems for Banks and the Corporate Governance Debate 
An  increasing  amount  of  research  documents  the  occurrence  in  the  real  world  of  the 
different corporate governance systems for industrial companies. For banks, however, the 
empirical evidence remains limited. 
From  a  recent  study  of  the  ten  largest  publicly  listed  banks  in  44  countries,  using  10 
percent of the voting rights as a threshold for control, the following picture emerges (see 
Caprio, Laeven, Levine 2003): 
(i)  only 25 percent of the banks are widely held, so that the type 1 agency problems 
inherent in the Anglo-American outsider system are not so prevalent. At the country 
level, in only 8 out 44 countries the  majority of the large banks has a dispersed 
ownership.
(ii)  The dominant model obviously is that of concentrated ownership corresponding to 
the Continental European insider system. More than half of the time the controlling 
shareholder is a family, and in 14 percent of the cases it is the State. It is even so in 
21 out of 44 countries that all banks have a controlling owner. 
On the occasion of many studies for nonfinancial firms, from which a somewhat similar 
overall picture emerges, the predominance of blockholders has been heavily criticised
10:
(i)  It is claimed that the Anglo-American system is superior in raising finance efficiently 
for  the  company.  Dispersed  shareholdings  allowing  for  a  large  free  float  and 
liquidity, better tune in to the increasing role of financial markets due to globalisation 
and  the  growing  importance  of  institutional  money  in  the  external  financing  of 
companies. 
(ii)  Also the power of controlling blockholders to expropriate the minority, i.e. to create 
type 2 agency problems is claimed to be a barrier to attract external market finance. 
The latter argument, however, should be further qualified according to a distinction to be 
made between voting rights and cashflow rights: 
(i)  When  control  rights  significantly  exceed  cashflow  rights,  incentives  may  indeed 
become very much distorted to the disadvantage of small investors. This may be 
achieved by various technologies separating cashflow rights from voting rights such 
as trust offices, preference shares, cross-ownership and pyramidal cascade structures 
of holding companies (see Devriese e.a., 2004). 
(ii)  Expropriation  moreover  requires  costly  transactions  such  as  setting  intermediary 
companies, taking legal risks etc. (see La Porta e.a., 2002). Hence, when cashflows 
rights increase, incentives for controlling owners to expropriate resources from the 
                                                
10 Among the many contributions, see in particular La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Schleifer, 1999. 12
company  decrease  as  it  involves  a  greater  reduction  in  their  own  cashflows  (see 
Caprio e.a., 2004). 
In this respect, the same study for the ten largest publicly traded banks in 44 countries 
provides a somewhat mixed picture. Controlling owners hold on average 35,75 percent of 
the control rights with a lower but still substantial amount of 27,45 percent of the cashflow 
rights.  In  15  out  of  the  36  countries  where  the  blockholders  dominate,  the  difference 
between control and cashflow rights is larger pointing towards potentially larger type 2 
agency problems
11.
It follows that for a more adequate approach of the agency distortions, the controlling 
ownership model should be differentiated according to two sub-categories: 
(i)  the  non-levered  or  straightforward  controlling  ownership  model.  It  applies  when 
cashflows rights are substantial and largely correspond to voting rights. 
(ii)  the levered controlling ownership model. It emerges when technologies have been set 
up  separating  cashflow  rights  from  voting  rights.  This  may  be  achieved  by 
differential voting rights and cross-shareholding, but as it appears in practice mainly 
by cascades of holding companies in a pyramid structure
12.
Family ownership of public firms, being the main fraction of concentrated shareholdings, 
is mostly of the non-levered type and may reduce agency problems has as been found 
recently for US firms (see Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
Whatever the broader debate on governance systems and arguments in favour of external 
equity financing, for banks these may carry less weight given their high leverage and larger 
access to debt financing. Arguments against the widely dispersed shareholdings model may 
have relatively more relevance for banks: 
(i)  The  shortermism  of  stock  markets  is  increasingly  being  criticized  especially  in 
periods  of  turmoil  in  stock  markets.  The  obsession  with  liquidity  and  short  term 
results,  in  particular  when  induced  by  short  term  performance  linked  options  for 
management,  may  have  unintended  consequences  in  destroying  long  term  value. 
Long term value creation for all shareholders requires long term commitment i.e. 
stable investors
13.
                                                
11 See Caprio, Laeven, Levine, 2003. These 15 counries comprise mainly Spanish or Portuguese language countries, and 
also Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
12 The available evidence for banks is still limited. For an application to Belgium, see Devriese, Dewatripont, Heremans, 
Nguyen, 2004. In a wider study for nonfinancial firms, the difference between control and cashflow rights is mainly 
attributed to pyramid structures (fully 26 percent of the firms that have an ultimate owner are controlled through 
pyramids), and only to a limited extent explained by differential voting rights and cross-shareholdings, see La Porta, 
Lopez de Silanes, Schleifer, 1999. 
13 According to Becht and Mayer, 2001, the insider model is perceived as conductive to activities with long realization 
periods, whereas the outsider model benefits short term investments requiring greater flexibility.13
(ii)  The trade-off between investor liquidity and investor commitment may have special 
relevance for banks as only long term players are good monitors. Investors who can 
easily exit by reselling at a fair price, have little incentive to create long run value 
improvement.  The  illiquidity  that  large  investors  face,  enhances  the  quality  of 
monitoring  (see  J.  Tirole,  2006).  This  argument  carries  more  weight  for  banking 
firms which notoriously are facing high monitoring costs. 
(iii)  The stability of shareholders may also be important to complement regulatory capital 
in the case of undercapitalisation, or even to bail-in ailing banks, which may prove to 
be more difficult when shareownership is widely dispersed. Finally, whatever the 
merit of this banking stability perspective for the efficiency of equity governance, it 
is important to further explore this stability perspective for debt government issues. 
Debt governance and risk attitudes 
Conflicts of interest between debtholders and shareholders with respect to risk taking exist 
in every firm, but type 3 agency problems of risk shifting are raised to a new dimension in 
the banking context (see Macay, OHara 2003). Given that banks are in the business of risk 
trading with a high debt-to-equity ratio, and that depositors protected by deposit insurance 
have no incentives to monitor these risks, they have more opportunities and incentives to 
engage in (excessive) risk taking. 
These  debt  governance  problems  are  further  to  be  analysed  as  a  function  of  the  risk 
incentives of the different parties involved in the corporation. 
Incentives for risk taking crucially depend on the opportunities to diversify risk. Portfolio 
theory  distinguishes  between  systematic  or  market  risk  on  the  one  hand,  and  non 
systematic  (idiosyncratic)  or  firm  specific  risk  on  the  other  hand.  The  latter  may  be 
diversified away in a portfolio allowing for a higher return on investment. It follows that 
parties who are more diversified have an interest in more risk taking by the firm. They 
have an interest in taking more firm specific risk as they can diversify it away in their 
wealth portfolio. 
In a typical firm managers are intrinsically more risk averse than shareholders: 
(i)  they stand to lose invested specific human capital and, in some cases, invested wealth if 
the firm goes bankrupt 
(ii) managers tie up all their human capital in the firm, so their degree of diversification is 
limited 14
Hence, managers care about the total risk of the firm being the sum of systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk. 
Whereas this applies when managers receive a fixed compensation scheme, things may 
change when they start receiving performance-based pay. With regard to the cash flow 
effect managers then face a trade-off between: 
(i)  future cash flows generated by specific human capital invested in the firm 
(ii) and  additional  cash  flows  generated  by  increased  performance  resulting  from  risk 
taking. 
When remuneration is linked to share prices, and especially when managers are paid with 
stock options, whose value can be very sensitive to the volatility of the underlying stock, 
managers may receive high incentives to take substantial risk to increase the value of their 
stock options. 
Also for shareholders the outlook for risk taking incentives for shareholders depends upon 
risk diversification opportunities. 
A typical financial investor is a diversified shareholder caring only about systematic risk. 
He has an interest in more risk taking by the firm as the firm specific risk is diversified 
away in his equity portfolio. 
Things may be different for strategic investors with concentrated shareholdings. Big block 
holders being generally less diversified have less risk appetite as they care about total risk 
including firm-specific risk. With levered control, however, as is the case in pyramidal 
groups, diversification is more likely and hence also the risk incentives increase. 
In this respect, risk taking is also going to be influenced by the identity of the controlling 
shareholder.  Different  owners  as  e.g.  a  family,  an  industrial  firm,  an  other  financial 
institution have different opportunities to diversify their wealth. Hence, they have also 
different attitudes towards risk
14. They differ moreover in their information, expertise and 
monitoring capabilities (See Devriese e.a. 2004). 
                                                
14 Founding families represent a unique class of shareholders that hold poorly diversified portfolios. See Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003. 15
Debt governance and corporate governance systems for banks 
The  next  step  is  to  relate  the  risk  incentives  for  the  different  parties  involved  to  the 
different corporate control systems. 
Shareholders of widely held companies, a system representing about 25 percent of the 
large banks, will be diversified. They have incentives for (excessive) risk taking at the 
expense  of  debtholders,  but  they  have  only  formal  and  no  real  control  to  do  so.  Real 
control resides with managers, who have no such incentives unless remuneration depends 
substantially  on  high  powered  options.  Hence,  type  3  agency  problems  are  solved  by 
management control in banks. 
Management  control,  however,  is  in  contrast  to  traditional  corporate  governance 
recommendations  for  nonfinancial  firms.  It  reintroduces  type  1  agency  problems.  The 
governance system then faces a difficult trade-off as governance mechanisms that operate 
to curb managerial power have negative side-effects on debt governance: 
(i)  an active market for corporate control for banks is not conductive to bank stability 
(ii)  promoting shareholder activism giving real control to diversified shareholders may 
increase risk incentives 
(iii)  performance linked pay may induce managers to take excessive risk 
To balance these conflicting interests, the role of the board of directors becomes all the 
more important, as will be further investigated. 
In  the  controlling  ownership  models  shareholders  acquire  real  control  by  holding 
substantial voting rights. It is easier for them to push management to engage in excessive 
risk taking and in risk shifting at the expense of debt holders. In order to avoid this, the 
regulatory and supervisory authorities have intervened to put more power with respect to 
the  banking  function  in  the  hands  of  management  by  so-called  bank  autonomy 
arguments
15.
Type 3 agency problems, however, are not only a question of power, but also of incentives 
depending upon the degree of wealth diversification of the controlling owners. 
                                                
15 To this end in Belgium the Commission for Banking, Finance and Insurance concludes with controlling owners 
agreements on the Autonomy of Bank Management. 16
Families, controlling 39 percent of the large banks, generally are poorly diversified and 
cannot be expected to be risk loving. Eventually also the 14 percent of the large banks that 
are state-owned may be assumed to have a similar attitude. Hence, half of the controlling 
owners  are  non-diversified  what  may  largely  correspond  to  the  straightforward  big 
blockholders, for whom also type 2 problems may be less acute. It follows that on the 
whole the straightforward controlling ownership model presents less trade-offs between 
equity  and  debt  governance  problems.  Moreover,  the  absence  of  an  active  market  for 
corporate  control  favours  banking  stability.  Also,  with  majority  shareholders  in  real 
control, there is less need for highly performance sensitive pay for management thereby 
reducing also their incentives for excessive risk taking. 
The question, arises, how these trade-offs are affected by imposing management control 
for this group of companies as is done by the so-called bank autonomy agreements. It may 
not do much to improve type 2 agency problems nor type 3 agency problems, but does it 
not introduce type 1 agency distortions? 
The remaining group of well-diversified controlling blockholders may largely correspond 
to the levered controlling owners, for whom voting rights and cash flow rights are widely 
divergent. Levered controlling ownership presents very difficult trade-offs between equity 
and debt governance. Imposing management control for the levered control group may 
help to avoid type 3, as well as type 2 agency distortions. 
3.  BANKS IN NEED OF AN ADAPTED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL? 
What ownership structures? 
An overall picture of the impact of different ownership structures on agency distortions is 
presented in table 1. The signs in the table reflect both the power (p) and the incentives (i) 
of the parties in real control. A negative sign for both power and incentives is  a necessary 
condition for the agency distortion to occur within the given ownership structure. 
It  follows  that  for  all  ownership  structures  trade-offs  between  the  different  agency 
problems are to be made. Type 1 distortions are best dealt with by controlling ownership. 17
Dispersed  ownership  avoids  type  2  problems.  For  these  two  standard  equity  agency 
problems the final outlook depends on the relative weights accorded to them. 
Compared to nonfinancial firms, for banks type 3 debt distortions carry more weight. The 
overall  outlook  then  is  such  that  levered  controlling  ownership  presents  more  agency 
distortions. It may explain why this ownership structure is often singled out and criticized 
in the corporate governance debate. 
The  comparison  further  depends  upon  the  availability  of  corrective  governance 
mechanisms and their effectiveness. With financial regulation and supervision effectively 
dealing with debt governance problems, the relative weight shifts more to type 1 and type 2 
equity governance problems. Also the availability and effectiveness of other corrective 
mechanisms of corporate governance will affect the choice. 
Table 1: Ownership Structures and Agency Problems 
  Agency 
  Distortions 









      p               i 
Risk Shifting to 
Debt Holders 
      p               i 
1. Dispersed Ownership  -  -  +   +   -  + /- 
2. Levered Controlling 
Ownership 
+   +   -  -  -  - 
3. Straightforward 
Controlling Ownership 
+   +   -  -/0  -  + /- 
- negatively or +  positively affects agency distortions 
Some of these mechanisms such as performance linked remuneration for management may 
change the whole picture. It is an important mechanism to balance the separation between 
management  control  and  ownership  (type  1)  in  case  of  dispersed  ownership.  The 
effectiveness of highly performance linked pay is, however, more and more disputed as 
option schemes may induce shorttermism in management behaviour and give incentives 
for  excessive  risk  taking  (type  3)  to  which  banks  are  especially  vulnerable.  In  the 
controlling  ownership  system,  however,  the  effects  of  remuneration  systems  for 
management are less of an issue. 18
In view of the potential conflicts of interest and the different trade-offs between various 
corporate  governance  mechanisms,  the  operation  and  the  composition  of  the  board  of 
directors becomes all the more important as corporate governance mechanism for banks. 19
Conflicts of interest and independency of directors 
The  board  of  directors  besides  giving  strategic  guidance  to  the  company  is  mainly  a 
monitoring specialist. Its balancing role very much depends on the power, the composition 
of the board determining who is in real control, and upon the incentives of the various 
types of directors involved. 
Conflicts of interest leading to agency problems very much depend upon the incentive 
structures  of  the  directors  involved.  To  deal  with  type  1  agency  distortions  a  director 
should  be  independent  from  management  (type  1  independency).  In  this  respect 
independent  directors  in  the  board  are  seen  as  an  important  preserve  against  the 
opportunism of management. Type 2 agency problems prescribe that a director should be 
independent from controlling shareholders (type 2 independency). Independent directors 
are needed to act as delegated monitors for minority shareholders. 
In  order  to  deal  with  type  3  debt  agency  problems  a  new  prudential  definition  of 
independence  for  directors  is  to  be  developed.  A  director  who  has  no  (or  minimal) 
shareholdings  in  the  company  and  receives  no  (or  limited)  performance  linked 
remuneration is financially independent from the firm and will be rather risk-averse (given 
also his directors liability). He is type 3 independent, and has no conflict of interest to act 
as a delegated monitor for debtholders. Things may become different when a directors 
remuneration  is  very  much  linked  (e.g.  through  options)  to  the  stock  prices  of  the 
company. Also when he holds a sizeable amount of equity of the firm in a diversified 
equity portfolio, he may have an interest in risk taking. 
For a director, who is also a controlling owner, risk incentives will depend upon his degree 
of diversification. As already argued above a straightforward controlling owner is more 
likely to be non-diversified than a levered controlling blockholder of the pyramidal type 
(see Devriese e.a. 2004). Type 3 independency is especially important for banks as it has 
been argued that directors have fiduciary duties not only to shareholders but also towards 
debtholders (see Macey and OHara 2003). 
A director who is independent on all three counts has incentives to act as deligated monitor 
simultaneously for all shareholders, and in particular also for minority shareholders and for 
debtholders. 20
Composition of the board of directors 
Agency distortions are not only a question of incentives, but also of real power. The other 
condition for agency distortions to occur is that the directors who are facing conflicts of 
interest are also in real control. This very much depends on the composition of the board of 
directors. 
Condition to deal with type 1 problems is a majority of type 1 independency in the board. 
In this respect the widespread practice to control management is to have a majority of non-
executive directors in the board. This, however, is not a sufficient condition. All or at least 
a larger number of these non-executives should be independent from management, so that 
there is a clear majority of type 1 independent directors in the board. 
Potential  type  2  agency  distortions  are  to  be  monitored  by  a  majority  of  type  2 
independency in the board. Hence, a sufficient number (not necessarily a majority) of non-
executive directors should be independent from the controlling shareholders, so that they 
together with management constitute a majority in the board. 
In order to avoid type 3 distortions especially relevant for banks, the additional condition is 
a majority of type 3 independency. This majority may be constituted by 
(i)  management executives, depending upon their remuneration systems 
(ii)  non-executive directors with non financial links to the company, the only link being 
their position as independent director 
(iii)  eventually  also  non-executive  directors  being  major  shareholders,  but  being 
financially non-diversified. 
As the respective  majorities of independents, i.e. which no conflicts of interest do not 
necessarily overlap in the three instances, the picture as to the required composition for the 
whole board may become rather complex. It will also differ among the main corporate 
governance systems as they face different agency trade-offs. 
When the composition of the board would be a mere reflection of the ownership structures, 
then the same outcomes as given in table 1 would apply. Obviously a different composition 
is needed for the board in order to balance the agency distortions. 
Within the dispersed ownership model independency of non-executive directors becomes 
the main issue. A majority of non-executive directors is necessary, but not sufficient. This 21
majority should be really independent from management (type 1). Given that highly linked 
performance remuneration is likely for management, these non-executive directors should 
have no such remuneration to keep them type 3 independent
16.
Also  levered  controlling  ownership  faces  important  independency  issues  for  non-
executives.  A  sufficient  number  of  them  should  be  independent  from  the  controlling 
shareholders, so that together with management they constitute a type 2 majority in the 
board. At the same time they should be financially independent from the firm (type 3) e.g. 
by  not  receiving  highly  performance  sensitive  pay.  Should  management  receive  such 
highly performance linked pay, than the number of these independent directors should be 
larger to guarantee a majority for type 3 independency. 
Finally, for the straightforward controlling ownership model independency issues are less 
important.  When  cash  flow  rights  are  substantial  and  approach  voting  rights,  type  3 
problems may be mitigated also by non-executive directors who represent the blockholders 
in  the  board.  To  monitor  type  2  problems,  however,  a  sufficient  number  of  the  non-
executive directors should also be independent from the controlling shareholders. 
EU legislative initiatives on the board of directors 
Finally, some recent legislative initiatives in the field of corporate governance may be 
critically examined, by comparing them with our conceptual exercise on the appropriate 
design of the board of directors. 
As to the appropriate composition of the board of directors a recent EU Recommendation 
preconises quite generally to look for an appropriate balance so that no small group i.e. 
management,  nor  non-executives  can  dominate  decision  making  in  the  board.  This 
recommendation becomes more specific for the composition of the specialised committees 
advising the board: the majority of their members should be independent. Independency 
is related to agency problems as the principle is advanced that these directors should be 
free of conflicts of interest such as to impair their judgement
17. Looking, however, into 
the  more  specific  criteria,  to  be  distinguished  into  functional,  family  and  economic 
independency,  it  appears  that  they  are  largely  confined  to  equity  governance.  Type  3 
                                                
16 A majority may convey formal control, but real control will only be achieved when they behave independently 
depending upon nomination procedures, their expertise, reputation etc.
17 EU Recommendation 15 February 2005 on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors and on the Committees 
of the Board. 22
independency is not specifically addressed, raising questions for the governance of firms 
potentially subject to important debt agency distortions
18.
With respect to remuneration systems the EU Recommendation of 2005 is limited to the 
independent  directors.  An  important  criterium  to  qualify  as  independent  is  that  they 
obtain no share options or other performance related pay from the company. For the other 
non-executive directors and also for management the issue of highly performance linked 
pay  which may  create  type 3 agency problems  is  not  addressed
19. Specifically for the 
banking sector, however, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision already pointed out 
prudently that the need for equity based compensation for management is not as strong in 
banking as in other industries
20.
4.  FURTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR COPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES 
As  the  conceptual  exercise  has  demonstrated  that  governance  principles  and  optimal 
governance arrangements are not homogenous to all firms when taking into account type 3 
debt agency problems, broader implications may be derived. 
Application to other financial institutions 
First, debt agency problems are important not only for banks, but also for other financial 
institutions. As different types of financial institutions present specific agency distortions, 
the (different) corporate governance implications have to be further explored. 
The specific characteristics of financial institutions that affect agency problems are to be 
distinguished as follows: 
                                                
18 The Belgian Corporate Governance Law of 2 August 2002 and the Belgian Corporate Governance Code Lippens are 
liable to the same criticisms. 
19 In Belgium the Code Lippens recommends for all non-executive directors that no performance linked pay should be 
given to them. For management, however, it is stated more vaguely that an appropriate portion of the remuneration 
is to be performance linked in order to compensate for individual performance. Specifically for the banking sector 
the CBFA advises for non executive directors not to link their remuneration to short term performance. 
20 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999. 23
(i)  leverage, i.e. high debt to equity ratios not only apply to banks but also to insurance 
companies. Liquidity and maturity mismatch risks are, however, less of a problem for 
insurance companies. 
(ii)  the  nature  of  products  and  services,  as  well  as  of  the  claimholders  presents 
similarities  but  also  important  differences
21.  Insurance  products  are  also  of  a 
fiduciary  nature  and  often  opaque.  For  bank  depositors,  however,  exiting  by 
liquidating their deposits is much easier than is the case for insurance policy-holders. 
Hence, the latter have more incentives to control their company ex-ante. Also the 
moral hazard problems involved are less as policy-holders do not benefit from the 
same safety-nets as depositholders
22.
(iii)  systemic externalities are not to be excluded in the insurance sector, but the risk of 
their occurrence tends to be much smaller, and also their consequences for the real 
economy are less severe. 
Whereas,  equity  governance  problems  may  be  largely  similar  for  banks  and  insurance 
companies, their debt governance problems may be different requiring a different corporate 
governance  design.  Similar  analysis  have  to  be  pursued  for  other  types  of  financial 
institutions. 
In  the  same  vein  financial  regulation  and  supervision  having  to  cope  with  the  same 
conflicts of interest and agency distortions, has traditionally been organised separately for 
banks, insurance companies and securities firms. Recently, however, this institutional set-
up  of  the  regulatory  and  supervisory  architecture  is  being  challenged due  to  structural 
deregulation  and  cross-sectoral  mergers  of  banks,  insurance  companies  and  securities 
firms.  Hence,  also  the  appropriate  corporate  governance  design  of  these  financial 
conglomerates is becoming an even more complex matter in need of further investigation. 
Evolution of corporate governance and take- over bid legislation in the EU 
Finally, the analysis raises further questions as to the evolution of corporate governance 
systems in Europe. 
Harmonisation of corporate governance is a long standing controversial issue in Europe. 
Corporate law is often considered to be an essential part of national economic and social 
traditions.  Hence,  harmonisation  measures  have  been  held  up  on  grounds  of  the 
subsidiarity  principle.  The  achievement  of  the  single  European  market,  however,  very 
much  relies  upon  the  removal  of  legal  barriers  requiring  an  European  approach  to 
                                                
21 See Heremans, 2000.
22 See Van Cayseele and Heremans, 1994. 24
corporate governance. In the recent internal market approach it is attempted to solve this 
by minimal harmonisation, i.e. mutual recognition complemented by essential standards at 
the EU level
23. In the same vein the EU Commission came to the conclusion that there is 
no need to expend energy on the development of a Corporate Governance code applicable 
to companies in the EU
24. When recognising that corporate governance needs not to be 
homogenous between countries, should the same principle not be extended in order to 
differentiate also among different sectors in the economy? 
In this respect also the adoption recently of the 13the EU Directive on Take over Bids may 
raise  some  eyebrows.  The  directive  aims  at  offering  European  business  greater  legal 
certainty with regard to take over bids while protecting the interests of shareholders
25. In 
particular in order to protect minority shareholders these EU minimum guidelines force 
someone, who as a result of his acquisition obtains control of a company, to make a bid on 
all other outstanding shares. 
The question necessarily arises whether this obligation in the directive, will not have major 
consequences  for  corporate  governance  systems  in  Europe?  Will  the  major  listed 
companies not have to converge to the Anglo-American dispersed shareholders model? 
Will it not amount to adopting the UK system requiring a mandatory bid on all shares 
whenever a control threshold of 30 percent has been reached?
26 It appears that in the U.K. 
90 percent of the twenty largest non-financial companies, and 83 percent of the ten largest 
banks have no shareholder holding more than 10 percent of the voting rights
27.
The directive has been presented as a component of the Financial Services Action Plan. 
Interestingly the broader implications for the whole corporate governance set-up have not 
been  addressed  properly.  It  is  questionable  whether  it  is  good  governance  practice  to 
introduce such important choices for corporate governance through the back door of EU 
financial market integration. Moreover, whereas the directive deals with equity governance 
issues, debt governance concerns are not addressed. Hence, the question whether particular 
                                                
23 See Lannoo, 1999 and Commission of the European Communities, November, 2002. 
24 See EU Commission, January, 2002.
25 See European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004. 
26 This threshold guaranties a free float of at least 70 percent. Financial investors are attracted by the greater liquidity 
and the absence of type 2 agency distortions. It should boost the development of the single European capital market 
and also the overall competitiveness of the European market by promoting corporate restructuring. The functioning, 
however, in practice of the market for corporate control as a disciplining mechanisms on management for type 1 
agency problems may be questioned. 
27 Similar  figures  apply  to  the  U.S.  see  e.g.  Caprio,  Lavaert,  Levine,  2003  and  also  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Schleifer, 1999. 25
prudential concerns for financial stability should not be taken into account? Are they best 
served by applying these principles indiscriminately to the banking sector? 




It  may  be  questioned  whether  the  principles  specifying  the  relationships  within  the 
corporation are to be extended as such to the banking firm. Compared to non-financial 
firms  banks  present  specific  characteristics,  i.e.  high  leverage,  fiduciary  products,  a 
multitude  of  small  claimholders,  systemic  externalities  w.r.t.  financial  stability.  These 
specificities affect agency distortions and are also the basis for specific financial regulation 
and supervision. As corporate governance is a necessary complement to regulatory and 
supervisory intervention, it should be approached not only from a point of view of profit 
maximisation but also from the perspective of financial stability. 
Compared to non-financial firms, in particular debt governance distortions may arise, as 
banks are particularly vulnerable to excessive risktaking. Hence, the need to investigate 
how different corporate governance arrangements that apply to non-financial firms, affect 
the  incentives  and  the  power  of  the  parties  involved  in  the  banking  firm  to  assume 
(excessive) risk. 
It  follows  that  the  usual  criticisms  on  the  predominant  blockholders  model  for  banks 
should  be  further  qualified.  Whereas  they  apply  to  levered  controlling  ownership  with 
complex structures such as pyramids, however,straightforward controlling ownership by 
non-diversified shareholders however, might provide an important governance mechanism. 
It  may  also  explain  the  predominance  of  family  ownership  in  the  banking  sector. 
Moreover,  the  analysis  of  risk  attitudes  of  the  parties  involved  in  the  banking  firm, 
introduces  a  new  prudentially  relevant  definition  of  independence  for  directors.  It  has 
                                                
28 Also path dependency and legal complementarities within national corporate governance systems make shifts in 
corporate governance models not very obvious. See Schmidt and Spindler, 2002. 26
important  implications  as  to  the  appropriate  composition  of  the  board  of  directors  for 
banks,an issue which has to be approached in a more systematic way. 
The  conceptual  framework    taking  into  account  risk  attitudes  and  financial  stability  
implications, is to be further extended to explore the corporate governance design for other 
financial institutions. It may also serve to critically examine some recent initiatives w.r.t. 
corporate law and corporate governance codes. 
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